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1 SALT LAKE CITY DEPT. 
• No. 931008026 MC 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT (hereinafter 
"defendant" or "Mr. Vasquez") and hereby submits the following as 
his APPELLATE BRIEF in the above-captioned matter: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals in this 
matter pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Court of Appeals; and 78-2a-
3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinant parts of the following rules, statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Appendix A: 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-501 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-32-1 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-32-2 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d) 
Amendment IV, VI, XIV, United States Constitution 
Article 1, Section 7 and 12, Utcih Constitution 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying 
Defendant's request to be represented by counsel. 
2. The key issue is whether the lower court abused its discretion 
by denying my request to be appointed counsel to represent me 
in my case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS 
On June 12, 1993, I was charged by Salt Lake Police Officers 
with the crime of soliciting sex, a Class C misdemeanor. On October 
18, 1993, a hearing was held on my motion to dismiss the case on an 
entrapment defense. The entrapment motion was denied and at the 
conclusion of the hearing Mr. Breeze, my attorney, moved the court 
to allow him to withdraw as my counsel. 
At a pre-trial hearing on January 10, 1994, I appeared without 
counsel and requested that the court appoint counsel to represent 
me. The court, The Honorable Commissioner Judith S. Atherton 
presiding, denied my request. Before this time, I had made numerous 
other requests to Commissioner Atherton in the court room and in 
the form of certified letters dated Aug. 3, and 12, 1993 and once 
again in December of 1993 that I be appointed counsel to represent 
me in my case. Up to this time Commissioner Atherton has yet to 
respond to any of my requests. 
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court, The Honorable Commissioner Judith S. Atherton, presiding 
has refused to appoint counsel to represent me in my case. I 
contend that I have a constitutional right to be represented by 
counsel. I cite SUPREME COURT decisions Gideon vs Wainvright, and 
Argersinger vs Hamlin, as the reasons and justification why I 
should be appointed counsel to represent me in my case. These two 
landmark SUPREME COURT decisions specifically and unequivocally 
enforce the Constitutional right to legal counsel for defendants 
who cannot afford to engage an attorney on their own. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I contend that I have a constitutional right to be represented by 
counsel. I cite SUPREME COURT decisions Gideon vs Wainwright, and 
Argersinger vs Hamlin, as the reasons and justification why I 
should be appointed counsel to represent me in my case. These two 
landmark SUPREME COURT decisions specifically and unequivocally 
enforce the Constitutional right to legal counsel for defendants 
who cannot afford to engage an attorney on their own. 
In addition I would like to cite the 6th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution which clearly states, M In all criminal prosecutions 
the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of 
counsel in his defense." Furthermore, the 6th Amendment's right to 
counsel is, " applicable to the states through the due process 
clause of the fourteenth Amendment." The State of Utah also 
specifically guarantees the appointment of Counsel to those 
defendants who cannot afford it.(77-32-1, 77-32-2, Utah Code Ann.) 
3 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED 
The State of Utah proscribes the appointment of counsel, unless 
there is a "substantial probability of the deprivation of liberty." 
(77-32-1, Utah Code Ann.) In my case, a Class C misdemeanor can 
carry a fine of $750.00 and 3 months in jail. These probable 
sanctions by themselves should justify the appointment of an 
attorney. In addition, if found guilty, the judge can also order 
probation and impose other restrictions which do egregiously 
impinge on a person's freedom and personal liberties, in fact, 
some of these alternate sentences can place restrictions on the 
liberty of the individual which are almost as severe as a jail 
sentence itself. 
These same restrictions, which include probation and fines, if 
violated can cause the defendant to be fined and imprisoned 
(incarcerated). This totally negates Utah's assertion/ contention 
that, Mno imprisonment/incarceration" will be imposed on 
a defendant who was not appointed counsel, because a court finds 
that the defendant did not, "face a substantial probability of 
deprivation of liberty." (Rule 8, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) 
Furthermore, a conviction and a criminal record in a case such as 
this can be detrimental to a person's reputation, as well as have 
an adverse effect on his personal, social, and vocational life. 
4 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED 
I will concur that I have been given time to prepare my 
defense. The key issue however, is that as an ordinary citizen, I 
am not versed with legal, judicial and court procedures, rules, 
techniques, and methods and therefore unable to prepare my defense 
in a legally proper and correct manner. Hence, I would be at a 
serious disadvantage to go before a jury trial without preparation 
and without legal counsel to represent me. 
In the other hand, I will be facing in court a able, experienced, 
powerful, and professional prosecutor versed in court procedures, 
and legal technology and engineering who has had the time to 
legally and judicially organize and prepare a case against me in 
the same precise and meticulous manner a CPA would conduct 
a highly technical and specialized audit for the (IRS). 
Even still, I have been empathically denied the legal counsel 
I will need to adequately prepare my defense in a timely fashion 
and in a legally and judicially correct manner. To allow me to go 
before an American Court on a Jury Trial without legal 
representation and advice is truly an outrage. This is not only a 
blatant assault on my civil and constitutional rights, but also 
makes a mockery of our American Justice System. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, I respectfully move the UTAH APPEALS COURT 
to overturn Commissioner Atherton's order to deny my request for 
counsel, that she appoint Counsel as soon as possible to represent 
me in my case and that I, as the appellant, be afforded any and all 
relief to which this court finds me entitled to. 
Jf DATED this day of August, 1994. 
MR. ROBERTO VASQUEZ, (PRO SE) 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I certify I mailed/hand delivered/faxed 8 copies, including 
one with an original signature of the foregoing to: 
Miss Mary Noonan, Clerk for 
THE UTAH [SUPREME COURT] 
[COURT OF APPEALS] 
230 S. 500 EAST SUITE 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
AND 2 copies of the foregoing to: 
Mr. Todd J. Godfrey 
Assistant S.L. City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 East, #125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
AlJk DATED on t h i s ^VIJM day of August, 1994. 




DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
RULES, 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT VI: (Rights of accused) 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall be committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be confronted 
with the witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defense. 
A M E N D M E N T XIV: (Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal 
protection) 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; or shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
law. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
(In applicable parts) 
Article I; Section 12: Rights of accused persons 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his won behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to be committed, and the right of appeal in all cases. In 
no instance shall any accused person, before final judgement, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against the wife, not shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
A 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(In applicable parts) 
Section 76-1-501 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
Section 77-1-6: Rights of the defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf. 
(d) To confront the witnesses testifying against him. 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure attendance of the 
witnesses in his behalf. 
(f) To speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district where the offense is alleged to have been 
committed; 
(g) To be admitted to bail in accordance with the provisions 
of law, to be entitled to a trail within 30 days after 
arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of 
the court permits. 
Section 77-32-1: Counsel for indigent defendants 
(1) Provide counsel for every indegent person who faces the 
substantial probability of the deprivaton of his liberty. 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; 
(5) Include the taking of first appeal of right and the 
prosecuting of other remedies before or after a 
conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in 
the interest of justice except for other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
Al 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED CONTINUED 
(In applicable parts) 
Section 77-32-1: Assignment of Counsel 
Counsel shall be assigned to represent indigent person who is 
under arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is a 
substantial probability that the penalty to imposed is confinement 
in either jail or prison if: 
(1) The defendant requests it;or 
(2) The court on its own motion or otherwise so orders and 
the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject of 
Section 78-2a-3(2) (d) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(d) Appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the 
small claims department of a circuit court. 
A2 
ADDENDUM PART ONE 
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ABGEESINGER v. HAMLIN, SHERIFF 
CEBTIORABI TO THE SUPHEM35 COX7BT OP FLORIDA 
<c 70-6015- Argued December 6, 1971—Reargued February 28. 
1972—Decided June 12, 1972 
<*£ right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the assist-
* *nce of counsel, which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as 
j ^ e applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Gideon v. Wain-
vright, 372 U. S. 335, is not governed by the classification of the 
offense or by whether or not a jury trial is required. No accused, 
jaay be deprived of his liberty as the result of any criminal prose-
"""cixtion, whether felony or misdemeanor, in which he was denied 
*-jlg aMBUade of counsel, in tins case, tae Supreme Court of 
^Florida erred in holding that petitioner, an indigent who was tried 
""for an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a 
"""I^ iJOO iine, or Dotii, and given a 90-day jail sentence, had no right* 
~~to court-appointed counsel, on the ground that the right extends 
^ffily tQ tT^s "*or BOP-retty offenses punishable by more than six 
months imprisonment." Pp. 27-40. 
B8 So. 2d 442, reversed 
DorraiAa, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, is which Bmc?-
mx, STXWABT, WHITZ, MARSHALL, and BLACXXTTN, JJ., joined. 
BtonuN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which DOUGLAS and 
hTWABT, JJ., joined, pott, p. 40. BTJRGTR, C. J., filed an opinion 
sacurring in the result, pott, p. 41. POWELL, J., filed an opinion 
oncarring in the result, in which RXHNQTTIST, J., joined, post, p. 44. 
Bruce S. Rogow argued the cause for petitioner on the 
eargument and / . Michael Shea argued the cause pro 
\ac vice on the original argument. With them on the 
rief was P. A. Hubbart. • 
George R. Georgiefi, Assistant Attorney General of 
Torida; reargued the cause for respondent. With him 
u the brief were Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, 
Qd Raymond L. Marky, Assistant Attorney General, 
>ined by the Attorneys General for their respective 
tales as follows: Gary K. NeUon of Arizona, Arthur K. 
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 27 
Opinion of the Court 
9 
- prenie Court by a four-to-three decision, in ruling on 
the right *° counsel, followed the line we marked out in 
nvncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159, as respects the 
•jjt to trial by jury and held that the right to court-
•ppointed counsel extends only to trials "for non-petty 
offenses punishable by more than six months imprison-
ment." 236 So. 2d 442, 443.1 
The case is here on a petition for certiorari, which 
we granted. 401 U. S. 908. We reverse. 
The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations 
F£s been made applicable to the States by reason of the 
Fourteenta Amendment j( see Duncan v. Louisiana, supra; 
ffa&hington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14; Klopfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 U. S. 213; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400; 
Qideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; and In re Oliver, 
533 U. S. 257), provides specified standards for "all 
mminal prosecutions." 
i For a survey of the opinions of judges, prosecutors, and defenders 
oncerning the right to counsel of persons charged with misde-
meanors, see 1 L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases 
s American State Courts 127-135 (1965). 
A review of federal and state decisions following Gideon is con-
ained in Comment, Eight to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. 
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 103 (1970). 
Twelve States provide counsel for indigents accused of "serious 
•rime" in the misdemeanor category. Id., at 119-124. 
Nineteen States provide for the appointment of counsel in most 
nsdemeanor cases. Id., at 124-133. One of these is Oregon, whose 
topreme Court said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 100-
101, 458 P. 2d 414, 418. "If our objective is to insure a fair trial 
n every criminal prosecution the need for counsel is not deter-
ruaed by the seriousness of the crime. The assistance of counsel 
nil best avoid conviction of the innocent—an objective as m> 
jorunt
 m the municipal court as in a court of general jurisdiction." 
laaiornia'a requirement extends to traffic violations. JilaJee v. 
tvuapd Court, 242 CAL App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771. 
Overall, 31 States have sow extended the right to defendants 
charged with crimes less serious than felonies. Comment, Eight 
o Counsel, tupra, at 134. 
30 / OCTOBER TERM, 1971 
Opinion of the Court 407U.S. 
While there is historical support for limiting the 
"deep commitment" to trial by jury to "serious crim-
inal cases,"2 there is no such support for a similar limita-
tion on the right to assistance of counsel: 
"Originally, in England, a person charged with 
treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, 
except in respect of legal questions which the ac-
cused himself might suggest. At the same time 
parties in civil cases and persons accused of mis-
demeanors were entitled to the full assistance of 
counsel. . . . 
• • • • « 
"[It] appears that in at least twelve of the 
thirteen colonies the rule of the English com-
mon law, in the respect now under considera-
tion, had been definitely rejected and the right 
to counsel fully recognized in all criminal prosecu-
tions, save that in one or two instances the right 
was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious 
crimes . . . ." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60, 
64-65. 
The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to 
counsel beyond its common-law dimensions. But there 
is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history, 
or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that it was 
intended to embody a retraction of the 'right in petty 
offenses wherein the common law previously did require 
that counsel be provided. , See James v. Eeadley, 410 
F. 2d 325, 331-332, n. 9. 
We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecu-
tions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than 
'See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the 
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917,980-
982 (1926); Jama v. HeadUy, 410 F. 2d 325, 331. Cf..Kaye, Petty 
Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 245 (195*9). 
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 31 
g Opinion of the Court 
.jYmonths may be tried without a jury, they may also 
yt tried without a lawyer. 
"TEe assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the 
£?v existence of a fair triaL The Court in Powell v. 
Alabama, supra, at 68-69—a capital case—said: 
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of 
little avail if it.did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in 
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is 
incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is un-
familiar with the rules of evidence. Left without 
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without 
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or other-
wise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one. He requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him. Without it, though' he be 
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction be-
cause he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how 
much more true is it ot the ignorant and illiterate, 
or those of feeble intellect." 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, supra (overruling Betts v. 
Wady, 316 U. S. 455), we dealt with a felony trial 
lut we did not so limit the need of the accused for a 
iwyer. We said: 
"din our adversary system of criminal justice, 
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire 
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless coun-
sel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an 
obvious truth. Governments, both state and fed-
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 35 
Opinion of the Court 
tion in such a court with the movement of cases. 
The calendar is long, speed often is substituted for 
care, and casually arranged out-of-court compromise 
too often is substituted for adjudication. Inade-
quate attention tends to be given to the individual 
defendant, whether in protecting his rights, sifting 
the facts at trial, deciding the social risk he pre-
sents, or determining how to deal with him after 
conviction. The frequent result is futility and fail-
ure. As Dean Edward Barrett recently observed: 
" 'Wherever the visitor looks at the system, he 
finds great numbers of defendants being processed 
by harassed and overworked officials. Police have 
more cases than they can investigate. Prosecutors 
walk into courtrooms to try simple cases as they 
take their initial looks at the files. Defense law-
yers appear having had no more than time for 
hasty conversations with their clients. Judges face 
long calendars with the certain knowledge that their 
calendars tomorrow and the next day will be, if 
anything, longer, and so there is no choice but to 
dispose of the cases. 
" 'Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defend-
ants in the criminal process, there is scant regard, 
for them as individuals. They are numbers on 
dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on. 
their way. The gap between the theory and the 
reality is enormous. 
" 'Very little such observation of the administra-
tion of criminal justice in operation is required to 
reach the conclusion that it suffers from basic ills.' " 
That picture is seen in almost every report. "The 
misdemeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and, 
frequently irresponsible preparation on the part of the 
cleiense, the prosecution, and the court. Everything is 
rush, rusn."" neiierstein, The importance of the Mis-
OCTOBER TERM, 1971 
Opinion of the Court 407 U. S. 
demeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 The Legal Aid 
""Brief Case 151, 152 (1970). 
There is evidence of the prejudice which results to 
misdemeanor defendants from this "assembly-line jus-
tice." One study concluded that "fmlisdemeanants rep-
resented bv attorneys are five times as likely to emerge 
from police court with all charges dismissed as are 
defendants who face similar charges without counsel" 
American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Counsel for Mis-
demeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970).t 
We must conclude, therefore, that the problems as-
sociated with misdemeanor and petty5 offenses often 
5
 Title 18 U. S. C. § 1 defines a petty offense as one in which the 
penalty does not exceed imprisonment for six months, or a fine of 
not more than $500, or both. Title IS U. S. C. § 3006A (b) provides 
for the appointment of counsel for indigents in all cases "other than 
a petty offense/' But, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
noted in James v. HeadLey, 410 F. 2d, at 330-331, 18 XL S. C. 
§ 3006A, which was enacted as the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, con-
tains a congressional plan for furnishing legal representation at federal 
expense for certain indigents and does not purport to cover the full 
range of constitutional rights to counsel. 
Indeed, the Conference Report on the Criminal Justice Act of 
1964 made clear the conferees' belief that the right to counsel ex-
tends to all offenses, petty and serious alike, H. R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
In that coigBaiBa*.^^ Procedure, -as-
amended in 1966, provide in Rule 44 (a): ['Every defendant who^ 
is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel, 
assigned to represent liim at every stage of the proceedingJfrgSL 
his initial appearance before the commissioner or the court through-
v. appeal, unless he waives such appointment." 
The Advisory Committee note on Rule 44 says: "Like the original 
rule the amended rule provides a right to counsel which is broader 
in two respects than that for which compensation is provided in the 
Criminal Justice Act of 1964: 
"(1) The right extends to petty offenses to be tried in the 
district courts, and 
"(2) The right extends to defendants unable to obtain cotmggL 
*N for reasons other than financial." 
